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The motivation and stimulus to establish this website was
twofold.
Firstly my eldest daughter, Katie, had been pestering me
for years to organise the various photographs and other
documents that I retained from my time in 55FST. Clearly the
material was not suitable for assembly into any sort of
ring-binder but would lend itself to a website or DVD.
It also came to my attention that much of the documentation about the FSTs had gone
astray in the middle to late 90's, when Millbank was closed and the move was made from London to Mytchett.
A great deal of material had been shredded and was beyond reach. It
seemed important to seek out any documents relevant to 55FST and
make them available on the internet. Once the website was
established and people began to log on a steady trickle of
reminiscences and documents have been accumulated. They appear
once every two or three months but all are valuable addition to
the record.
The contribution made by medical services is rarely
acknowledged. Detailed descriptions of battles are commonplace
but the "butcher's bill" rarely had a mention other than in
simple figures of so many killed or wounded until the present
conflict in Afghanistan. Footage of the hospital at Camp Bastion
has now been seen on the television, details of wounded soldiers
being rehabilitated at facilities such as Headley Court are
commonplace and of course coffins being carried through Wootton
Bassett are tragically almost a daily occurrence. The records of
55FST gave the opportunity to record what went on just behind the front line
nearly forty years ago.
Secondly, in the autumn or late summer of 2004 I saw a
television programme about a Field Hospital in Iraq. One clip
hit a raw nerve. A surgeon was standing in front of a high
tech anaesthetic machine which was festooned with variety of gas
bottles and he was suggesting that the patient that he had just
seen should now be dealt with by the unit neurosurgeon. The
circumstances were so different from my experience. A single FST
comprising 13 people in
Oman in the 70's cannot be compared with the current large scale
medical provision in Afghanistan. In a "light"
FST close to the front line the surgeon and the anaesthetist do
not have the luxury either of complex investigations, discussion with a range of colleagues or of
ideal
resuscitation equipment. The immediate problem has to be sorted out
instinctively and quickly before the next laden helicopter arrives. The war in Dhofar and the present day campaigns
developed into what is
now loosely termed "asymmetric warfare" with the
opportunities to create static medical services in relatively
safe environments.
Even though I had not touched an anaesthetic machine since soon
after leaving Salalah I knew that, from my own experience, the chances of an efficient supply of gases
for an anaesthetic machine was probably
“pie in the sky”. The supply of anything in a remote bit of
desert was and may still be, at best, uncertain.
The present day provision of medical care and the degree of sophistication
is of the highest order and great credit is due to those who set
it up and manage the huge range of services that it offers.
Unless there has been a sea change since the 70's I believe
that reliance upon a long chain of supply and resupply could be
a problem. The ordering and supply of surgical and medical
materials electronically should in theory be very efficient. In
practice there are many opportunities for links in the chain to
fail and the more complex the databases of required materials
the more opportunities for failure.
The Haloxaire anaesthetic machine was a simple robust bit of kit which, with the
occasional use of oxygen and a limited portfolio of drugs, did
what it "said on the tin". It was easy to use and did not require
an anaesthetist of any great experience to operate it. Halothane
has its disadvantages however and is not a strong analgesic,
tends to drop the blood pressure and depresses respiration. Following
on from the Haloxaire the design and developement of the
TriService Anaesthetic apparatus was another step forward. It
did however sometimes require the provision of a mechanical
ventilator and often used a combination of two inhalational
anaesthetics from two vapourisers. Some of the simplicity of the
Haloxaire was lost and it perhaps required a more skilled
anaesthetist than the short service medical officer. It was a
very versatile setup and could be used in a variety of ways
giving it distinct advantages over the Haloxaire especially in
the hands of an experienced anaesthetist.
I would suggest that
whilst it is important to have highly trained experienced
anaesthetists there is also a need to have "short service
anaesthetists" who can cope with the less complex and demanding
anaesthetics. The KISS principle applies and might very well
both overcome any shortages of men and materiel and provide a service where resupply
of either was a problem.
One may reflect on whether the outcome for patients treated at
the vastly more complex present day field hospitals with their
large numbers of highly
trained and specialist staff is significantly
better than that at 55FST back in 1972?
We only saw a tiny number of patients and none of the casualties
had the multiple limb amputations that have occurred in
Afghanistan. When this website was
started it was not possible to make comparisons but as time has
gone by it seems to be clear that the lives of very severely
wounded soldiers in Afghanistan, who would not have survived in
Dhofar, are now being saved. Whilst the survival rates may not
be
statistically very different the increased morbidity for so many
soldiers from these savage wounds is significantly greater.
The recent article on
"Casualty Evacuation Timelines" by Lt Col Paul Parker makes interesting
comparisons.
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