The Affair at Mirbat 
The basis of this account is an unclassified document used in a presentation for those revisiting the battlefield a few years ago and again in December 2010.There are many accounts of the battle and this one has simply been used as a framework and must be regarded as such rather than a definitive account. There are many other accounts which are contradictory e.g. bombs dropped by the Strikemasters. After forty years there may be a degree of confabulation in these accounts. There are reported to be contempraneous unpublished post-engagement reports written by BATT, SAF and SOAF which would have great credibility in establishing the historical facts but for reasons best known to their custodians they remain unavailable to the wider audience who have an interest in the battle.  It is for the reader to make their own assessment from the limited resources that are available.
At 05:30 am on 19 July 1972 the adoo commenced their attack on the town of Mirbat.[1]
The enemy PFLOAG had something of a setback in October 1971 when Operation Jaguar succeeded in establishing a firm base at Jibjat. They assumed that the BATT outpost was only a medical team and that they would be able to overwhelm it with relative ease. They calculated that the khareef would so hinder flying operations because of a low mist that the helicopters and the Strikemasters would be ineffective.
They therefore assembled a core force from Yemen of about 300 men armed with soviet-made 81 mm mortars, 120mm Katuyshka rockets, 12.7mm Spahgin MGs and AK47 rifles.
Another source - J.E. Peterson -goes into more detail about their armament. It would have been 400 but one of their firqa leaders got a cob on about something or another and withdrew a 100 of his men and wandered off back up the jebel

Moving over the jebel in groups of 40, from the west, they laid out a security screen in front of them to clear the villages and round up recruits.

The adoo intended to approach from the North and the East by way of the wadis and capture Mirbat town. They intended to hold it for a day, denounce and execute the wali and his advisors, spread propaganda and then retreat to the jebel. If this had been achieved the townspeople would have been terrified of supporting the sultan as they would have no confidence that the sultans forces could protect them. Civil government would break down as no one would have the courage to take up administrative posts.
The Firqa Force were not aware that the adoo were about to attack. Their purpose at Mirbat was both for training and for operations against the adoo. They were there to support the government's regular forces and their administrative representatives in the town. Two days before the battle the adoo engineered a confrontation on the edge of the Jebel Samhan to draw out the Firqa and BATT.  The Jebel Samham is the jebel beyond the Jebel Ali
 
The  British forces soon to be defending Mirbat consisted of the BATT commanded by

Captain Mike KEALY OC
Cpl   BENNETT 2IC  
Cpl Jeff TAYLOR No 2 on GPMG
Cpl   LABALABA  
LCpl Roger COLE No 1 on GPMG  
LCpl   HUSSEY    
Tpr Tom TOBIN Troop Medic
Tpr Pete WARNE  PRC-316  and .50 Browning  
Tpr   TAKAVESI    

In addition to their personal weapons they had very little additional armament; one 82mm mortar, a 0.5" Browning MG and a 7.62 GPMG.
The Dhofar Gendamerie, who were Northern tribesmen armed with .303 rifles, formed a picquet ten strong on the Jebel Ali and twenty strong in the DG Fort[2]
The 25 pdr gun at the DG fort was manned by four members of the Oman artillery.
In the west at the Na'ib Wali's fort there were thirty local militia or askars armed with .303 Lee Enfield rifles and Martini-Henry rifles.[3]
At around 05:30 the adoo attacked the DG positions on the Jebel Ali and killed all of the GD picquet bar two who escaped back towards the town. They established Heavy (12.7mm) MG positions on the Jebel Ali with which they could fire on the town or at aircraft. The threat from aircraft at this point was minimal as the khareef cloud and mist had reduced the cloud level to 150 feet.
The adoo formed up in their assault positions and moved in groups of ten or so towards the town. Larger groups of about twenty gathered in front of the DG fort. The 25pdr was being fired over open sights towards the enemy who were as near as 40m away attempting to climb over the wire in front of the fort (this wire has been described as little more than a very robust cattle fence)[4]
All of the gun crew were wounded until only Gunner Walid Khamis of the Oman Artillery remained active.[5]
A BATT member, Labalaba, ran to the DG fort to help man the 25 pdr gun. However he was soon hit in the chin, or "chinned" as he described it over the radio. Takavesi ran straight to the gunpit from the BATT house  under heavy fire to support Labalaba.
Kealy contacted BATT HQ at Umm al Gwarif and requested casevac for Labalaba and air to ground support when the cloud base was high enough to make it possible.
There was now no radio contact with the gunpit. Kealy realised that was the centre of action and where, as commander of the BATT he should be. He transferred command of the BATT house to Bennett, changed out of his flip flops (!), and, accompanied by Tom Tobin the BATT medic, took the slightly more circuitous route along a shallow wadi to the back of the DG fort 500m away. During the run they were spotted and engaged by an adoo machine gunner. However they finally reached the ammo pit just behind the 25 pdr
Tobin then  gave Gnr Walid Khamis first aid whilst the seriously wounded Labalaba crawled back to the ammo pit and told Kealy that Takavesi is also seriously wounded in the shoulder back and head but still giving covering fire from the gunpit.
(Meanwhile)  Adoo now pierced the wire - running up to the fort
Laba returns to the gun and turns it right and fires over open sights. Killed by shot through neck.
Enemy closes the position.
Grenades.
Tobin hit - mortally wounded.[6]
Kealy tells Bennett to fire his MGs and mortars onto the fort.
Tells Kealy that Strikemasters on the way
Dud grenade falls into ammo pit with Kealy
Strikemasters arrive and strafe from West with rockets and cannon fire.
Adoo take cover behind far side of fort.[7]
The record states that now there was a lull(!) and Kealy moved over to the gunpit  to find
'Tak leaning against gun pit covering left side of fort seriously wounded but still in action.
Laba dead.
Tobin unconscious.
Not sure who held fort'
LCpl Hussey joined Kealy in the gunpit.
Strikemasters attack the Jebel Ali.
By 09:30 'G' Sqn Gp arrived SE of Mirbat behind the enemy.
"Debuses and bounds towards the town killing as they go"
Firquat had deployed in threes behind rocks to the east of the town to prevent the enemy from getting in.
Adoo were now caught between Firquat and advancing 'G' Sqn.
Kealy was worried about "blue on blue"
A helicopter was then flown to the back of the fort for casevac.
Tobin and Gnr Walid Khamis loaded in.
Tak declined to be carried and walks to heli.
In the aftermath of the Veterans Tour to Oman in December 2010 one officer (GA)  e-mailed following observation to me :

"I'm not really one for re-reading very low level tactics years later: perspectives are always so very personal".

With that firmly in mind this account may be as accurate as any other.
Mirbat Fort
The slope from the wire in front of the fort is quite steep. This video shows the gunpit at the top beside the fort and the steepness of the slope from where the LandCruisers were parked - approximately where the wire was.  Anyone approaching the fort from the NE would have been sheltered from the BATT house and the Walis Fort especially when they came close in.
This video is in *.wmv format with a file size of 13Mb
Phases of the Battle
One way to divide up the battles is into three parts.
The first when all of BATT were in the BATT house. When the attack started Laba immediately went to the fort and 25pdr
The second after Laba was injured and Tak joined him in the gun pit.
The third when Laba was killed and Kealy and Tobin left the BATT house and joined Tak at the fort.
Only their basic tasks have been shown. Tasks such as humping ammunition, acting as FAC, acting as signaller, IC and 2IC, as a rifleman and medic all have to be included as the need and opportunity arose.
SOAF and Mirbat
The SOAF contribution to Marbat was crucial and is outlined on the web page attached to this section.
The Adoo Viewpoint
One interesting point in this narrative does suggest that the adoo had established some sort of medical support team with certainly one designated first aider - Waleed - and some regular assistants to help him.

A former member of the adoo, present on that day,  related to one of the British Officers [PS] many years later in London that the casualty toll, when those who had died of their wounds had been included, was in the region of 200.

The other point undoubtedly being the despairing observation "Then the planes came"
'Debrief' of the Adoo prisoners
Immediately after the battle three adoo prisoners were taken to Umm Al Ghwarriff and were debriefed in an attempt to obtain information that would be immediately useful to those still at Marbat
The Omani Viewpoint.
There is a brief account in the SAF Museum at Bait al Falaj.
The  FST Outcome
What was the outcome for the injured ?
Awards for Bravery
A number of awards were made for bravery to those who took part in the battle. There are many who believe that because of the secrecy surrounding the war and the political desire to downplay British involvement the awards did not reflect the outstanding bravery shown by those involved.
BATT
Then and now
[1] There are many accounts of the Battle of Mirbat. The basis for this account is an unclassified document used at a battlefield presentation some years ago. Other factual comments have been added from other sources. The webmaster has only included those that he believes to be accurate and from a reliable source. As far as possible I have tried to avoid "opinion" and present only fact. There will inevitably be conflict within this document and with other accounts of the battle elsewhere.[BdeB]
[2] Their part in the battle is not recorded [PW] but it has been stated that they were unsure of their role on account of a failure in communications[VT]
[3] Fifty firqa from the Firqat Al Umri were based at the fort and were on patrol "up the jebel" at the commencement of the battle [PW]
[4] In the early stages of the battle the gun fired on registered targets i.e. known approach routes and the adoo mortar line. In the later stages the adoo was too close to get the (required) depression on the gun barrel. It became more a weapon of intimidation, forcing the adoo to keep their heads down as artillery rounds whistled over their heads [PW]
[5] I cannot identify in the anaesthetic records which of the wounded treated in the FST were Omani artillery other than Walid Khamis /Khalfan.[BdeB]
The only record I can find is the citation for the Sultan's Gallantry Medal.[BdeB]   The point in the battle at which he was injured is not written down [PW]
  His wounds were serious and the anaesthetic record card indicates that he had several injuries including one which paralysed him from the knees downwards as the nerves in his spine had been damaged[BdeB]
[6] This might imply that Tom Tobin died soon after his multiple and serious injuries. This was not the case. He was evacuated to the UK and died many weeks later perhaps from complications arising from a tooth being forced deep into his lungs when he was hit in the jaw.[BdeB] One book (OS) relates that whilst in hospital soon before his death in October 1972 a thoracotomy was  performed to try and remove the tooth fragment. One of the members of the VT recalls going to see him in hospital but although he stayed for an hour was unable to raise any response from him [RL-VT-2010]
[7] Nobby Grey's account in "SOAF & Marbat" describes the Strikemasters' role in considerable detail